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 INTRODUCTION 
 Danny  Busch  and  Deborah A.  DeMott 
 I.  Scope of the Book 
 1.  In general 
 Th e subject matter of this book, asset management, is a distinctive sector of the fi nancial 
services industry through which fi rms and individuals with professed expertise recommend 
and in many instances determine the assets that will comprise the investment portfolios held 
by their clients. An asset manager may hold discretionary authority to make investment deci-
sions unilaterally on a client’s behalf; whether the manager possesses such authority deter-
mines how the manager–client relationship is categorized in some (but not all) regulatory 
systems. In other systems, the defi nitional linchpin for regulation is not whether an actor 
manages a client’s investment assets but whether the actor serves as an ‘investment adviser’ as 
defi ned by the regulation. Th e book’s scope is limited to asset management relationships that 
pertain to individual portfolios of investment securities, as opposed to management of 
collective investment schemes such as mutual funds and UCITs. However, the same man-
ager may handle both collective schemes and individual accounts, and units in collective 
schemes often constitute some portion of the assets held in individual portfolios. 
 Asset management relationships diff er in many respects, in particular in the characteristics 
of clients served by managers and in the fi rms and individuals that populate this industry. 
Asset managers serve clienteles that vary widely in salient characteristics, including invest-
ment acumen and sophistication, investment objectives, bargaining power, and tolerance for 
investment risk. In various ways, the regulation of asset managers diff erentiates among types 
of clients. Investment managers diff er as well in their expertise, the value and types of assets 
they manage, their geographic range of operation, and the clientele of investors they serve. 
Th e composition of the investment management industry includes stand-alone indepen-
dent fi rms, as well as managers situated within or associated with fi nancial services fi rms that 
provide other types of services, such as banking, insurance, and brokerage. In any event, and 
however classifi ed by specialized regulation or by a jurisdiction’s generally applicable law, at 
the heart of the legal relationship between a client and an asset manager are the duties each 
owes the other and the consequences the law assigns to breach of these duties. 
 Th e book’s geographic scope encompasses several European jurisdictions plus Canada and 
the United States. Among the European jurisdictions, all but one (Switzerland) are member 
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states of the European Union and, as such, subject to EU-level directives on fi nancial services. 1 
Th ese EU jurisdictions — England and Wales, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Scotland, and Spain — have all implemented the 2004 Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and its provisions applicable to asset manage-
ment. Chapter 2 details MiFID’s history, defi nitions, and requirements. Although MiFID 
unquestionably increased the extent of harmonization in the regulation of EU fi nancial 
markets, this book demonstrates that signifi cant diff erences remain among MiFID jurisdic-
tions. Th is is so for many reasons. In each jurisdiction history and economic circumstances 
combine with general or ‘background’ law to produce a distinctive legal and regulatory con-
text for the provision of asset management services. Th ese diff erences are prominent for 
issues that determine asset managers’ liability towards their clients and remedies available to 
the client. 
 Asset management is distinctive, if not unique, because the applicable law is in fact com-
posed of a mix of legal doctrines that range from the general to the very specifi c and across 
boundaries between public (or administrative) law and private law. Th ese bodies of law 
include the private law of contract, agency, tort, and trusts, grounded in civil and commer-
cial code provisions in civil law jurisdictions; statutes and administrative regulations appli-
cable to capital markets and the fi nancial services industry, some but not all of which are 
specifi cally geared towards asset management relationships; provisions in contracts between 
asset managers and their clients; and, in many jurisdictions, self-regulatory rules and proce-
dures developed by industry-based organizations that may carry the force of law. Absent the 
force of law, industry practices may shape the application of formal legal doctrine, for exam-
ple, in assessments of whether a manager acted reasonably and with due care and through the 
development and use of standardized contract terms. Industry practices and legal require-
ments may also generate gatekeepers that impose additional constraints on asset managers; 
that is, other actors may furnish services that are essential to asset managers’ operation under 
terms that require monitoring the asset manager’s compliance with specifi c laws. 2 Th e insti-
tutions that enforce the law include specialist agencies and enforcement bodies situated 
within industry bodies, as well as general courts and other mechanisms for dispute resolu-
tion. Of course, clients themselves also enforce the law, subject to the doctrinal and institu-
tional constraints elaborated in successive chapters of this book. 
 Adding to the complexity, in most jurisdictions covered by this book, law is made at more 
than one level. EU member states are subject to MiFID as implemented by or transposed 
into national law. Canada, like the United States, refl ects a distinctive blend of national-level 
and provincial- or state-level law, administrative regulation, self-regulation, and governmen-
tal and non-governmental institutions. 3 In Switzerland, a non-EU state and a major global 
fi nancial centre, 4 self-regulatory organizations play a prominent role and the asset management 
1  MiFID is also applicable to nations within the European Economic Area (EEA), which Switzerland is 
not. 
2  On gatekeeping functions generally, see John C. Coff ee, Jr, Gatekeepers (2006). For further elaboration in 
the asset management context, see para 1.29. 
3  Th e provinces of Ontario and Quebec are especially signifi cant because they are the two most populous 
central provinces. See para 14.07. 
4  Among other indicia of its prominence, Switzerland is the leader in cross-border banking with a 27 per cent 
market share. See para 10.02. 
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industry itself is highly professionalized but not subject to specifi c licensing or other regula-
tory requirements as a legal matter. 
 Th e book’s structure refl ects this complexity. Following the treatment of MiFID in Chapter 2, 
the chapters detail the law applicable to asset management in each of the jurisdictions 
included in the book. Each chapter begins with an introduction to features of that jurisdic-
tion’s asset management industry including available data about aggregate values of assets 
under management and salient characteristics of governmental structures and institutions. 
Th e chapters next examine the defi nition (or characterization) of asset management for regu-
latory purposes, followed by its characterization within private law. Each chapter then dis-
cusses the relevant regulatory institutions and their requirements, including, for MiFID 
jurisdictions, how MiFID’s requirements have been implemented. Th ese include require-
ments applicable to asset managers’ organization, conduct of business, execution of orders 
aff ecting clients’ portfolios, custody of clients’ assets, and market abuse by asset managers. 
Each chapter also considers the impact of rules issued by self-regulatory organizations, rang-
ing from formal legal recognition to more indirect forms of infl uence and authority. In each 
jurisdiction covered in the book, applicable regulation has long ‘tentacles’ 5 (although argu-
ably ones that diff er in length, breadth, and texture) that structure the provision of asset 
management services. 6 Nonetheless, due to the nature of asset management relationships, 
other non-regulatory sources of law remain salient. 
 Against this extensive regulatory background, the chapters examine an asset manager’s duties 
as specifi ed by the jurisdiction’s private law, taking into account the interrelationships 
between private law duties and regulation. In all jurisdictions, the starting point is the con-
tract that stems from the relationship between a client and an asset manager, 7 preceded by 
any applicable pre-contractual duties. Th e bases on which an asset manager may be subject 
to liability to a client as a consequence of its breach of duty follow, as do the bases on which 
an asset manager may be subject to liability as a consequence of another person’s act or omis-
sion. Each chapter examines the remedies available to a client and the extent to which duties 
otherwise applicable to a manager may be varied or eliminated, or their consequences miti-
gated, through a contractual provision. Th e chapters conclude by examining the extent to 
which parties to an asset management relationship are free to choose the law to govern their 
relationship and the forum in which disputes will be resolved. 
 Th e remainder of this Introduction does not attempt to summarize the book’s content in 
comprehensive and detailed fashion. Instead, the Introduction next discusses the economic 
signifi cance of asset management, followed by a general framework within which to assess 
some of the specifi cs of regulation applicable to asset management. A particular focus is the 
interplay between regulation and liability, as illustrated by specifi c regulatory techniques 
5  See para 15.03 (Scotland). 
6  Indeed, a specifi c regulatory environment may be so pervasive that it becomes unwise for a client negotiat-
ing an asset management agreement to insist on inclusion of a clause specifying that the contract will be gov-
erned by the law of the client’s place of business, as opposed to the manager’s: ‘[t]he investment manager is a 
regulated professional services provider whose operations will have been organized in accordance with the 
principles and regulatory framework of its place of business’, although it is understandable that a non-local 
client may wish to ‘seek the protection of its own courts in the event of a dispute with a foreign investment 
manager’. See para 11.116 (England and Wales). 
7  In some cases within the scope of this book, the relevant legal relationship is established by a trust 
instrument. See para 13.09 (United States). 
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evident in the regulation of asset managers. In the concluding chapter we identify a few 
common themes that run through the treatment in individual chapters of asset managers’ 
liabilities in relationship to a particular jurisdiction’s regulatory framework. 
 2.  Economic signifi cance 
 Asset management has economic signifi cance, both for clients and their managers and by 
aggregate measures. Whether or not a client’s portfolio is successfully managed may deter-
mine, for a household, the ability to fund income needs in retirement or meet other life goals, 
consequences that if aggregated across similarly situated household portfolios may carry 
broader economic signifi cance. For an institutional client (eg a foundation) or a municipal-
ity or other governmental unit, the results of portfolio management may aff ect the client’s 
ability to carry out its activities or fulfi l its responsibilities to its constituents. Although the 
global scale of asset management is diffi  cult to measure, 8 using any defi nition of asset 
management the value of assets under management is large. In 2011, one study reported 
$121.8 trillion in assets under management on a worldwide basis, which represents an 
8 per cent increase of $20 trillion from 2010. 9 Th e investment management business is not 
immune from the eff ects of general economic and fi nancial cycles. 10 During the 2008 fi nan-
cial crisis, many clients shifted assets into cash and redirected their assets back into equities 
thereafter. 11 Some of the cases detailed in various chapters illustrate investment management 
gone awry in the face of broader developments in fi nancial markets. 12 Additionally, as the 
book’s individual chapters illustrate, many investment managers operate beyond the national 
boundaries of the jurisdiction in which they were formed, placing asset management within 
the set of cross-border activities that aff ect capital markets. In many jurisdictions, not just 
those covered by this book, a foreign manager’s ability to operate outside its home jurisdic-
tion is subject to regulatory constraints that can limit the products it may provide or the 
clients it may serve, while shifts in regulatory practices more broadly may require adaptation 
away from historic practices. 13 
 3.  Regulation’s goals and limitations in perspective 
 To an economist, asset management would represent a prototypical principal–agent rela-
tionship, in which a principal (a client or prospective client) obtains the services of a special-
ist agent (the manager) and delegates responsibility and pays a fee for the benefi t of 
discretionary management services for which the client lacks expertise. Agency costs in this 
8  Marcia L. MacHarg and Barton B. Clark, International Survey of Investment Adviser Regulation 1 
(2d edn 1994). 
9  Boston Consulting Group, Global Wealth 2011: Shaping a New Tomorrow (2011). Th is report defi nes 
assets under management to include ‘cash deposits, money market funds, listed securities held directly or indi-
rectly through managed investments, and onshore and off shore assets’ and to exclude ‘wealth attributed to 
investors’ own businesses, residences, or luxury goods’ (ibid at 1 fn 1).  
10  Relatedly, indicia of the profi tability of asset management businesses also fl uctuate over time. For 2010, 
although the average pre-tax profi t margin increased to 23 basis points, an increase of 4 basis points from 2009, 
revenue margins were lower in most geographic regions than prior to the 2008 fi nancial crisis and cost-
to-income ratios remained higher than pre-crisis levels (ibid 5). 
11  Ibid 7. 
12  See eg para 5.04 (Italy).  
13  See para 10.105 (Switzerland); see also Boston Consulting Group, Global Wealth 2011, 5 (observing that 
‘[o]ff shore wealth managers, particularly those based in Switzerland, faced the most signifi cant challenges, as 
the push to increase tax and regulatory compliance as well as international reporting stemmed the fl ow of assets 
and imposed new costs’). 
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context stem from risks that the manager will prefer, over a client’s best interests, either its 
own interests or those of other clients, or that the manager will be insuffi  ciently diligent, 
careful, or skilled in acting on behalf of its client. Agency costs also encompass costs incurred 
by the client in monitoring the manager to the extent feasible and otherwise self-protecting 
against potential lapses by the manager. 14 Reducing such costs, which are endemic to asset 
management relationships, is a core objective of regulation, which aims to protect managers’ 
clients as investors. As this book illustrates, this core objective situates the regulation of asset 
managers within the broad province of securities regulation; the specifi cs detailed in this 
book illustrate the repertoire of regulatory techniques available more generally. To be sure, 
jurisdictions diff er in the specifi c techniques or strategies deployed towards this objective. 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions household clients are additionally protected by consumer 
protective legislation that ranges in applicability well beyond the bounds of investment ser-
vices and products. MiFID itself diff erentiates between non-professional or ‘retail’ clients 
and other clients deemed to be more sophisticated. 15 Furthermore, MiFID was geared to 
serve broad objectives; at the EU level, it was aimed at creating a single market for fi nancial 
services and at harmonizing the protections available to investors, towards a general goal of 
increasing the competiveness of fi nancial markets in the European Union. 16 
 In some respects, the regulation of asset managers diff ers from other components of securi-
ties regulation. Much of securities regulation focuses on the quality of information that 
pertains to investment assets, for example, by requiring accurate disclosure by issuers of 
securities in prospectuses and in periodic or current reports. Th is makes sense; investment 
securities diff er from other assets because they lack intrinsic value and represent rights in 
something else. 17 Likewise, securities are not consumable but rather are comparable to a cur-
rency that may be traded in secondary markets. Assuring the availability and accuracy of 
information about the ‘something else’ from which a security derives its value, and guarding 
the integrity of pricing in information-driven secondary markets, are the central regulatory 
objectives. 18 Seen in this light, an asset manager or investment adviser intermediates between 
its client — the ultimate investor — and the issuer of a security. By fi ltering information gen-
erated by issuers of securities and through decisions to buy and sell securities at any given 
price, asset managers are a component force in market pricing more generally. Th us, systemic 
concerns for the informational integrity of securities markets extend to the regulation of 
asset managers and their conduct. To the extent a manager’s judgment is biased by confl icts 
of interest, such as secret payments received from issuers or undisclosed own-account hold-
ings in securities purchased for clients’ accounts, the manager’s decisions implicate systemic 
concerns about the fl ow of information to, and pricing within, securities markets, beyond the 
manager’s duties in a relationship with any particular client. 19 Furthermore, a jurisdiction’s 
14  On agency costs and mechanisms to address them, see ‘Agency Costs and Corporate Governance’ in 
1 New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 26–30 (Peter Newman ed 1998). 
15  In particular, retail investors are distinguished from professional investors and eligible counterparties. See 
paras 2.60–2.67 (MiFID). Th e EC is considering amending the relevant defi nitions to exclude municipalities 
from the category of ‘eligible counterparty’ because the fi nancial crisis and episodes of alleged mis-selling sug-
gest the present defi nition does not adequately refl ect the ability of some non-retail clients ‘to understand the 
risks to which they are exposed, especially in the case of very complex products’ (ibid para 2.104). 
16  See para 2.01 (MiFID). 
17  Th omas L. Hazen, 1 Securities Regulation 13 (5th edn 2002). 
18  Ibid 13–14. 
19  See James D. Cox et al, Securities Regulation 1003–4 (5th edn 2009). 
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regulation of asset managers may refl ect additional and broader regulatory commitments, 
such as assuring compliance with anti-money laundering, 20 anti-terrorist fi nancing, and 
anti-tax evasion laws. 
 No system of regulation, however well designed or well enforced, is likely to ensure perfect 
compliance by investment managers with the duties they owe to investors, whether or not 
the duties originate in the regulation itself or in other bodies of law. Th us, regardless of juris-
diction, it is important to consider the circumstances under which an asset manager who 
breaches a duty owed to a client is subject to liability to the client, the potential means to 
enforce that liability, and the remedies that may be available to the client. Focusing on liabil-
ity illustrates complex patterns of interrelationships among the sources of law applicable to 
the asset manager–client relationship. In particular, MiFID itself does not address questions 
of liability and remedies, which remain governed by the national law that is applicable to the 
asset management relationship in question. Th e book demonstrates that MiFID jurisdic-
tions diff er on many signifi cant issues, including the most basic question of whether or how 
a manager’s breach of a duty articulated in MiFID (and the local jurisdiction’s implementa-
tion of MiFID) is itself a basis on which liability may be grounded. Th e concluding chapter 
examines this point more extensively. 
 Th e book also demonstrates that, MiFID aside, liability questions — and complex interac-
tions among separate bodies of law — are inescapable even in jurisdictions with long-estab-
lished and complex systems of specialized regulation. In Canada, as in the United States, 
elaborate structures of statutory and administrative regulation, which articulate bases for 
managers’ liability, are layered upon concepts and doctrines developed by cases (and, in 
Quebec, in a general Civil Code) outside this specialized context. Over time, those general 
bodies of private law shape developments in more specialized settings like the regulation of 
asset management and, in turn, themselves may refl ect the infl uence on general law of apply-
ing the law in a more specialized context. To be sure, liability questions are signifi cant even 
in the absence of specialized regulation. In Switzerland, in which asset management as such 
is not a regulated service, asset managers are subject to duties as their clients’ agents and 
through an elaborate web of law and self-regulation. 21 
 II.  Regulation and Liability in Context 
 1.  General 
 Viewed within the context of regulatory design, the prospect that an actor may be subject to 
liability after-the-fact of a breach of a duty imposed by regulation might be seen as a failure 
in either the design or the enforcement of the regulation, or both. However, regulation is 
limited in scope for many reasons. Regulation imposes costs on the regulated constituency, 
ultimately borne in many cases by its clients or even more broadly, as when over-regulation 
stifl es useful innovation. Sensitivity to such costs relative to regulation’s anticipated benefi ts 
20  In Switzerland, independent investment managers are subject to governmental audit only in connection 
with their proper performance of duties imposed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1995, which applies to 
all fi nancial intermediaries whether or not subject to licensing, regulation, or supervision for other purposes. 
See para 10.01.  
21  See paras 10.09 to 10.19. 
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is both inevitable and desirable on the part of legislators and regulatory administrators. 22 
Th us, although conduct that leads to liability may evidence regulatory failure, it may also or 
alternatively refl ect the limited nature of any regulatory system, itself the consequence of 
judgments and trade-off s made in the course of legislation and its implementation and 
enforcement. 
 A separate question is the extent to which regulation — in the sense of a public agency’s sus-
tained and focused control exercised over activities that a community values 23 — and liability 
are eff ective substitutes for each other. Th at is, by assigning rights to private parties and creat-
ing or tweaking liability rules, a state might consider using court-enforced liability rules as a 
substitute for regulation and its enforcement by public regulatory bodies. Th e theory is that 
the prospect of liability and the cost of compensating victims would deter conduct that vio-
lates rights. It is widely acknowledged that this approach is not an adequate response to some 
problems, such as environmental pollution. Th e diffi  culties of setting standards for manufac-
turers and other polluters through after-the-fact litigation, determining the damage caused by 
pollution, and facilitating access to the judicial system are overwhelmingly beyond the capac-
ity of liability rules and private-party litigation. 24 In many areas, liability and regulation are 
better seen as complementary activities; for example, regulation may usefully set general stan-
dards with greater predictability than case-by-case litigation under liability rules, and the 
standards may be informed by regulators’ greater access to relevant knowledge. Moreover, as 
an instrumentality of the state, a regulator may have access to information not available to 
private parties and become informed of problematic conduct at an earlier time, enabling the 
regulator to take action prior to the occurrence of injury. In contrast, liability rules may 
address instances that lie beyond the scope of the regulation or that refl ect non-compliance 
with the regulation or its lag in the face of ongoing developments. Liability may also be a 
better mechanism in some instances to provide compensation to injured parties because fact-
specifi c litigation can be more sensitive to the circumstances of conduct that led to the injury 
and the specifi cs of the injury itself. Additionally, public enforcement confronts resource 
limits that may seem inevitable. Of course, the breadth or exclusivity with which a body of 
regulation should occupy a fi eld, relative to litigation under liability rules, is often contested. 
 In any event, it is helpful to consider interactions between liability and regulatory choices. 
Th e next section begins with a selective survey of regulatory techniques used in connection 
with asset managers. Th e following section identifi es and examines a few salient examples of 
interactions between liability and regulation based on the survey. 
 2.  Techniques of regulation and asset managers 
 A.  General 
 Th e distinctiveness of asset management explains the variety of regulatory techniques used in the 
jurisdictions covered in this book. Th is section discusses four such techniques: (1) mandated 
22  See Robert Baldwin, Understanding Regulation 94 (1999). Even given scepticism about purely economic 
appraisals of regulation’s effi  ciency, ‘there is a role for the appraisal of costs and benefi ts in regulation but it is a 
constrained one. . . . What can be done is to use economic appraisals not to impede regulation (as an end in 
itself ), or in order to give business a say in regulatory policy-making, but as a supplement to the policy-making 
process’ (ibid).  
23  P. Selznick, ‘Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation’ in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 
363 (R. Noll ed 1985), noted in Baldwin, Understanding Regulation, 2. 
24  See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 177 (1982). 
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disclosures by the manager; (2) registration and licensing requirements; (3) conduct of busi-
ness requirements, in particular arrangements for custody of clients’ portfolio assets; and 
(4) self-regulation grounded in industry organizations, perhaps best seen as an aspect of the 
‘style’ of a jurisdiction’s regulation more generally. Th ere are diff erences among jurisdictions, 
including the extent to which a particular regulatory approach dominates a jurisdiction’s 
overall regulatory approach. Of course, the available repertoire includes other regulatory 
techniques not highlighted here in the interests of space and the reader’s time. 
 B.  Mandated disclosure of information 
 As a regulatory technique, mandating the disclosure of information has been characterized 
as ‘augmenting the preconditions of a competitive marketplace’. 25 Th at is, a disclosure regime 
does not mandate conduct by those subject to the regulation, nor does it necessarily restrict 
the choices available to consumers of the regulated service. Th e objective is enabling better 
informed choices, in this context enabling clients and prospective clients to draw compari-
sons among managers across criteria informed by their disclosure of specifi c types of infor-
mation. An advantage of disclosure as a regulatory technique is that less fi ne-tuning of 
standards is required of the regulator itself, with lower risks of error. 26 To be sure, some 
disclosure requirements have the likely eff ect of reshaping conduct because by mandating 
disclosure the regulator creates an incentive to avoid conduct that, if known, would be det-
rimental to an actor’s reputation. More generally, mandated disclosure may prompt useful 
discussion within a regulated fi rm and productive interactions with its legal counsel, such 
that, although the relevant disclosure requirements are imposed by state authority, they are 
implemented through decisions internal to regulated fi rms themselves, arguably resituating 
them as participants within the regulatory process and enhancing compliance with regula-
tory objectives by enrolling actors within regulated fi rms in ‘the regulator’s way of thinking 
about the market’. 27 To be sure, disclosure is not the sole regulatory technique that may carry 
this consequence. 
 Unsurprisingly, mandated disclosure by asset managers is a widely used regulatory technique 
in jurisdictions covered by this book. An underlying principle of MiFID is that investors 
should be adequately informed when they make investment decisions, including decisions 
concerning asset managers. 28 MiFID’s Implementing Directive details the specifi cs of ade-
quacy, which vary depending on whether the client is a retail or a professional client; profes-
sional clients are assumed to be better able to identify for themselves the information needed 
to make informed decisions. In general and with the degree of detail varying with the cate-
gory of client, information must be furnished about the investment manager itself, the 
nature and risks of fi nancial instruments, the safeguarding of client funds and other assets, 
and fees and costs. On some issues, MiFID left discretion in implementation; in Italy, for 
example, in which the law permits a third party to hold in an omnibus account fi nancial 
assets belonging to an asset manager’s retail (or potential retail) client, the management fi rm 
has a duty to inform its client of this fact, as well as a duty to provide a prominent warning 
of the risks. 29 Th e prevalence of mandated disclosure as a regulatory technique does not mean 
25  Ibid 161. 
26  Ibid 163. 
27  For full development of this point, see Annelise Riles, Collateral Knowledge 234–6 (2011). 
28  See para 2.79 (MiFID). 
29  See para 5.25 (Italy). 
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that the technique is beyond criticism on varying grounds, including the basic observation 
of diminishing returns when disclosure becomes ‘top heavy’ 30 and lesser details obscure more 
important information, overloading and dulling the discriminatory powers of the disclo-
sure’s intended user. Additionally, the regulatory duty to disclose specifi ed information is not 
equivalent to a manager’s affi  rmative duty to warn a client about fi nancial risks associated 
with a particular transaction 31 or other possible implications of the duty of care that the 
manager, as an agent, owes its client as principal. 
 In the United States, the mandated disclosure of specifi ed information has long been central 
to the regulatory system applicable to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 (the Advisers Act). 32 Indeed, such disclosure is an adviser’s primary duty; advisers are 
subject to specifi c disclosure requirements, including an obligation to furnish clients and 
prospective clients with information as specifi ed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). By specifying what must be disclosed, and mandating a format, disclosure regulation 
of this style might facilitate a prospective or present client’s ability to draw comparisons 
among advisers. 
 More noteworthy, and more distinctive, is the dominance of mandated disclosure as a regu-
latory technique in the United States compared with some of the other jurisdictions covered 
by this book, including Canada. 33 As becomes evident in subsequent paragraphs, on some 
issues the United States regulates more through mandated disclosure in preference to other 
potential regulatory techniques. 
 C.  Registration and licensing requirements 
 With the exception of Switzerland, all jurisdictions covered by this book require that an asset 
manager comply with a licensing or registration requirement administered by a public regu-
lator, unless the manager is exempt from the requirement. Th e specifi cs of these require-
ments vary. In MiFID jurisdictions, prior authorization is required to perform investment 
services (including asset management) as a regular occupation or business on a professional 
basis. 34 Among MiFID’s requirements for authorization are membership in an authorized 
investor compensation scheme and compliance with prescribed minimum capital require-
ments. Minimum capital requirements are greater when a manager holds clients’ assets or 
engages in particular activities associated with higher risk. 35 In Ireland, authorization requires 
an in-person meeting with the Central Bank, followed by submission of extensive information. 36 
Before granting authorization, the Central Bank must be satisfi ed as to the probity and com-
petence of each of an applicant’s directors and senior managers, among other criteria. 
Th e Bank may impose additional requirements on an applicant. 37 In Canada, regulation 
for this purpose is conducted on a provincial level. Registration and licensing in Ontario 
require meeting requirements for profi ciency; individuals falling within the regulatory 
30  Lachlan Burn,  Disclosure in the EEA Securities Market — Making Sense of the Puzzle 3(2) Capital Markets 
Law Journal 139 at 145 (2008).  
31  See paras 7.93 and 7.114 (the Netherlands). 
32  On distinctions between investment advisers under the Advisers Act and MiFID’s defi nition of asset 
manager, see paras 13.06–13.10 (United States). 
33  See para 14.02 (Canada).  
34  See para 2.24 (MiFID). 
35  See para 11.18 (England and Wales). 
36  See para 12.23. 
37  See para 12.24. 
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defi nition of portfolio manager must have worked for a minimum amount of time in the 
industry and hold the CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) designation 38 unless the regulator 
grants an individual exemption on the basis of comparable qualifi cations or experience. 39 
 In contrast, although investment advisers in the United States who are not exempt are 
required to register with the SEC, adviser registration does not require compliance with capi-
tal adequacy or other fi nancial requirements, nor does it require that prospective advisers 
have specifi c credentials or experience, 40 be members of an investor compensation scheme, 41 
or meet in-person with SEC personnel. Instead, the regulatory technique that underlies 
adviser registration is disclosure, both to the SEC, via the completion of a form, and to pro-
spective advisory clients. For clients, registrants must prepare a brochure that covers 18 items 
prescribed by the SEC and furnish the brochure either before or at the time a client enters 
into an advisory relationship. 42 Supplementary brochures must be prepared for each indi-
vidual supervised by an advisory fi rm who has contact with clients or who makes discretion-
ary investment decisions. 43 And, once an adviser registers, it becomes subject to examination 
by the SEC. 44 
 D.  Conduct of business requirements: Custody arrangements 
 Jurisdictions that subject asset managers to specifi c regulation use regulatory techniques in 
addition to mandated disclosure and licensing/registration requirements. As noted in para-
graph 1.06 for MiFID, asset manager regulation imposes requirements that go to the man-
ager’s conduct of its business. Despite the dominance of mandated disclosure as a regulatory 
technique in the United States, aspects of investment advisers’ conduct are subject to sub-
stantive regulation. 45 Th is section comments in particular on regulations that aff ect a 
manager’s custody (or safeguarding) of clients’ fi nancial assets. 
 A client is subject to evident risks when a manager has physical custody of, or otherwise 
exercises control over, assets belonging to the client. Th ese include exposure to claims of the 
manager’s creditors in the event of its insolvency; confusion concerning ownership when the 
38  Although the CFA Institute, the licensing body for the CFA designation, is not designated as a self-
regulatory organization for purposes of securities regulation and lacks power to impose statutory or regulatory 
requirements, its Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct stipulate duties CFAs owe to clients, 
which overlap with and duplicate obligations directly imposed by securities regulation and the general law, as 
well as the duties imposed and enforced by the IIROC, the national self-regulatory organization for the securi-
ties industry in Canada (see para 14.76). Th is places the CFA Institute within the ambit of the overall regulatory 
context applicable to Canadian asset managers (see para 14.77).  
39  See para 14.50. Indeed, Toronto is second only to New York City in the number of residents who hold the 
CFA designation (see para 14.214). 
40  See para 13.29. 
41  Investment advisory clients of Bernard Madoff ’s notorious Ponzi scheme were able to receive compensa-
tion from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) because as a registered broker-dealer Madoff ’s 
fi rm was a member of SIPC, which insures customer accounts up to certain limits and provides mechanisms to 
liquidate failed fi rms. Madoff  did not establish a separate business unit for his bogus advisory business and 
used letterhead stationery in communicating with advisory clients that displayed a logo proclaiming SIPC 
membership. See Diana B. Henriquez, Th e Wizard of Lies 222 (2011). 
42  See para 13.30. 
43  Ibid. 
44  See paras 13.33–13.37. 
45  A prominent example is the structure of fees that a registered adviser may charge its clients. Subject to 
exceptions, registered advisers may not charge performance fees, ie fees calculated as a percentage of the capital 
appreciation in an account (as opposed to a fee based on a percentage of the assets in the account) (see 
para 13.62). 
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manager’s record-keeping is inadequate; conversion and other forms of misappropriation; 
and facilitating fraudulent schemes that require the creation of fi ctitious statements concern-
ing assets in clients’ portfolios. Risks are also present when clients’ assets are deposited with 
a third party. Th us, although it is unsurprising that regulations applicable to asset managers 
address custody, the jurisdictions covered by this book diff er in how custody arrangements 
are regulated. To some extent these diff erences refl ect whether custody is perceived to be a 
function that should fall within the regulated province of banks and credit institutions. 
Th us, categorizing a function may determine its regulatory treatment. 
 MiFID permits asset managers to hold fi nancial instruments and funds belonging to clients 
so long as the manager makes ‘adequate arrangements’ to safeguard clients’ assets and rights 
in the event of its insolvency and to prevent usage of such assets on the fi rm’s own account 
without the client’s express consent. 46 If the manager deposits clients’ assets with a third 
party, the manager must select the depository with due care, skill, and diligence. 47 Custody 
regulation in the Netherlands implements this general pattern through a detailed set of 
rules. 48 
 In contrast, in Italy the regulation implementing MiFID does not contain comparable rules 
because custody of clients’ investment assets falls within the regulatory powers of the Bank 
of Italy and is governed by a Bank regulation. 49 German regulation restricts the provision of 
custody services to licensed banks; when an asset manager is itself a bank, it is customary for 
custody to be governed by a separate agreement. 50 Likewise, in Switzerland, independent 
asset managers may not maintain cash or securities accounts for their customers. 51 In Canada, 
asset managers do not provide custodial services; although institutional clients typically have 
their own custodian, managers serving retail clients may have access to their brokerage 
accounts. 52 In the United States, a complicated SEC rule defi nes ‘custody’ broadly and 
requires that investment advisers deemed to have custody must maintain client accounts 
with a qualifi ed custodian, as defi ned by the rule. 53 Such an adviser must also have a reason-
able basis to believe that quarterly account statements are sent to clients. 54 Finally, formal 
regulation aside, practice in a particular market may shape custody arrangements. In Poland, 
fi rms that provide only asset management services typically do not act as custodians of 
clients’ assets; the practice is to enter into a separate custody agreement with a full service 
brokerage fi rm or a bank. 55 
 E.  Th e ‘style’ of regulation and self-regulation 
 Observers of regulation note that regulatory systems diff er in what might broadly be termed 
‘style’. Some regulators are more responsive than others to inquiries from and concerns artic-
ulated by the regulated constituency; regulators vary in the relative fl exibility or rigidity with 
which they enforce rules and in whether enforcement has more of an administrative than a 
46  See para 2.40 (MiFID). 
47  See para 2.42 (MiFID). 
48  See paras 7.33–7.36. 
49  See para 5.34. 
50  See para 4.59. 
51  See para 10.08. 
52  See para 14.84. 
53  See paras 13.64–13.65. 
54  See para 13.50. 
55  See para 8.28. 
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prosecutorial cast. 56 Th e overall eff ectiveness of a jurisdiction’s regulation of asset managers 
may stem from managers’ responsiveness to the bodies that supervise them, in turn likely a 
function of the ongoing relationship between the regulator and asset managers. Th us, in 
France, in which asset managers’ liability rarely features in judicial proceedings, managers are 
supervised by an authority with disciplinary powers; 57 relative to the number of inspections 
conducted by the supervisor in 2009 (80), very few cases came to the enforcement commit-
tee for breaches of asset management rules that resulted in injuries to investors. 58 In Poland, 
twenty years on since the establishment of a free market, there are virtually no high-profi le 
cases involving breach of duties owed to clients by Polish investment advisers and managers, 
an outcome attributed to a robust regulatory body, the Financial Supervision Commission. 59 
 Overall regulatory eff ectiveness is also a function, at least in complex fi elds like asset manage-
ment, of the degree to which formally separate bodies of regulation complement and rein-
force each other. One example of complementarity is the gatekeeping function served by 
clearing fi rms in the United States. Typically, clearing fi rms — large broker/dealers — do not 
have client contact for the accounts with respect to which they furnish clearing services such 
as trading, settlement, and delivery of securities. 60 A clearing fi rm has a duty to be alert to 
illegal conduct on the part of the investment managers it serves, including violations of trad-
ing and anti-money laundering rules. Its failure to discover such conduct makes it subject to 
discipline. Another example of complementarity is the dual operation of know-your-cus-
tomer rules in some jurisdictions. In Canada, an investment adviser’s duty to ascertain a 
client’s identity and investment profi le obliges the adviser to take reasonable steps to deter-
mine whether the client is an insider of an issuer of publicly traded shares. Th e adviser’s duty 
to know its client thus functions, not only as a means to protect the client against unsuitable 
investments, but as a gatekeeping mechanism to safeguard market integrity. 61 
 Regulatory eff ectiveness over time may require shifts in authority among separate regulatory 
bodies, their consolidation, or the complete displacement of one body by a new one. For 
example, following the 2008 fi nancial crisis, in Ireland the Central Bank came to play an 
increasingly prominent role in supervising fi nancial services fi rms and enforcing its rules 
against non-compliant fi rms. 62 Th e regulatory landscape in the United Kingdom is shifting 
to replace a single regulator for fi nancial services with, inter alia, a new specialist regulator 
with responsibility for conduct issues across the spectrum of fi nancial services. 63 Coordination 
among separate regulators is also a signifi cant element of overall eff ectiveness. Th us, although 
securities regulation in Canada is a provincial function, coordination occurs through mecha-
nisms that compensate for formal jurisdictional diff usion, in particular through a self-styled 
‘informal’ association of securities regulators that develops model regulations to be adopted 
by provinces (designated as ‘National Instruments’), including regulations applicable to 
asset managers. 64 
56  Baldwin, Understanding Regulation, 56. 
57  See para 3.05. 
58  See para 3.161. 
59  See para 8.87. 
60  See para 13.79. 
61  See para 14.63. 
62  See para 12.145.  
63  See para 11.11. 
64  See paras 14.40–14.42. 
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 In securities regulation generally, regulation that seeks to determine the merits of securities 
off ered for investment is often denounced as ineff ective to prevent fraud 65 and ineffi  cient as 
a regulatory technique even from the perspective of honest issuers and the professionals who 
serve them in securities-related matters. 66 In the realm of asset management, the closest anal-
ogy to ‘merits regulation’ (distinct from the licensing and registration requirements discussed 
in paras 1.22–1.23) is regulation of the contents of the management contract. Such regula-
tion also has obvious implications for the relationship between public and private law because 
when the relevant regulation specifi es the contractual terms that are permissible, it forecloses 
the application of contract-law principles to terms to which the manager and the client 
themselves have agreed or would have agreed absent the state-mandated terms. Among the 
jurisdictions covered in this book, the experience in Spain up through 2010 is unique. As 
authorized by the relevant ministry, the Spanish regulator drafted and circulated a ‘normal-
ized model contract’ as a stated minimum for portfolio management contracts; in time the 
model became the standard, perhaps because management fi rms were required to submit 
their standard contracts in advance to the regulator for its review and comments. From 2010 
onward, this framework applies only to contracts with retail investors, and fi rms need no 
longer seek advance regulatory authorization for their standard contracts. Spanish regulation 
continues to require submission to the regulator of a brochure stating the fees — including 
the maximum fee — charged by the fi rm for all services rendered on a regular basis. 67 
 Another determinant of overall regulatory style is the extent to which regulatory functions 
are devolved to self-regulation based in the relevant industry. Observers of regulation some-
times characterize the development of self-regulatory regimes as defensive responses by an 
industry to hold governmental regulation at bay. 68 On the other hand, and less cynically, 
actors within an industry may have a stronger commitment to rules and enforcement bodies 
they view as ‘their own’ 69 than they would to the same rules and enforcement mechanisms if 
promulgated by a governmental body, and the rules may be better informed, more readily 
adjusted in light of changed circumstances, and closer to standards that are realistically 
attainable by regulated fi rms. Enforcement within a self-regulatory regime may be more 
eff ective. 70 
 No position in this debate will be ventured here. However, it is noteworthy that the jurisdic-
tions covered by this book vary in the extent and status of self-regulation. Th ese variations 
appear not to be a function of the existence and range of industry associations themselves. 
For example, in Luxembourg, there is no organization characterized as self-regulatory and no 
self-regulatory rules applicable to individual asset management, but the Luxembourg 
Bankers’ Association (the ABBL) includes in its membership most banks and fi nancial insti-
tutions, as well as professionals in the fi nancial sector. ABBL represents their interests but 
does not play a self-regulatory function. 71 Separately, an industry’s interests may prompt 
investment in industry-wide initiatives towards standardization in contract terms that, 
although not typically viewed as self-regulatory, may structure how industry members 
65  Hazen, Securities Regulation, 27. 
66  Cox et al, Securities Regulation, 16. 
67  See paras 9.18–9.22. 
68  Baldwin, Understanding Regulation, 39. 
69  Ibid 30. 
70  Ibid. 
71  See paras 6.06 and 6.60. 
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conduct business with clients. Th us, the UK-based Asset Management Association and its 
predecessors have developed model forms for use with institutional clients in response to the 
potential of ‘protracted negotiation of contracts that seek to document the same scope of 
services’. 72 
 In contrast, in Switzerland, self-regulatory organizations (SROs), in particular the Swiss 
Bankers’ Association, are a substantial component of regulation. In ways that have evolved 
over time, the Swiss fi nancial regulator has set standards for asset managers via reliance on the 
Bankers’ Association. 73 Most recently the regulator defi ned, as investors qualifi ed to invest in 
the likes of hedge funds and private equity, only clients of licensed fi nancial intermediaries 
(such as banks and securities dealers) or of asset managers affi  liated with an SRO with a code 
of conduct conforming to the regulator’s guidelines. 74 In Italy, three associations for asset 
managers draft and issue guidelines but these have no formal eff ect; their motivation is to 
obtain the regulator’s approval and recognition of compliance with the MiFID framework 
and aid their members’ compliance. 75 In the United States, current debate focuses on SROs 
as vehicles for enforcing regulatory rules, in particular via the examination of member fi rms. 
Although securities broker-dealers have long been subject by statute to an SRO, investment 
advisers have not been. 76 Th e SEC has recommended, in response to a legislative mandate, 
that Congress consider whether one or more SROs should examine advisers and whether the 
SRO for broker-dealers should examine advisers who are dually registered as broker-dealers 
for their compliance with the Investment Advisers Act. 77 
 A related but separate debate is whether the substantive content of regulation itself is best 
formulated as general principles or as more specifi c rules. Generally-formulated principles 
appear to leave more discretion to individual fi rms, eff ectively devolving a regulatory func-
tion to the fi rm level, distinct from devolution to an industry-based SRO. MiFID itself, 
although often said to be principles-based, represents a mix of detailed rules and more gen-
eral principles. 78 In a background note to the fi rst draft of the MiFID implementation direc-
tive, optimism is expressed concerning the eff ects of principles-based formulations, which 
are said to ‘create . . . strong incentives for the fi rm to monitor its own activities and determine 
whether its activities comply with the principles’. 79 Whether such incentives are realized is, of 
course, a separate question. On the other hand, generally stated regulatory requirements 
may create uncertainty and lack of predictability, a worrisome prospect to fi rms and their 
legal counsel if a generally drafted regulation constitutes a basis for retroactive action by the 
regulator, including the imposition of penalties for non-compliance. 80 Eff ectiveness in a 
principles-based regulatory regime may require high levels of mutual trust among its partici-
pants, in part because eff ective compliance is a consequence of polyvalent or networked 
72  See para 11.63. 
73  See para 10.15. 
74  See para 10.17. 
75  See para 5.41. 
76  See para 13.03. 
77  See para 13.37. 
78  See paras 2.18 and 2.19 (MiFID). 
79  MiFID First Implementation Directive, Background Note at 6. 
80  See Julia Black,  Th e Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation 3(3) Capital Markets Law Journal 
425, 426 (2008). 
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eff ects, that is, the interactions of many actors, including industry-based groups structured 
and operating with varying degrees of formality. 81 
 Finally, in at least some of the jurisdictions covered in this book, private sector actors in 
practice may adopt, as their own through contract, the content of regulatory rules. Th at is, 
asset management agreements in some MiFID jurisdictions may reproduce some or all of the 
MiFID rules of conduct, 82 implying a ‘peculiar interplay’ 83 as between regulatory provisions 
and the contractually-imposed obligations that result from contracts formed between pri-
vate sector actors. Although this practice diff ers formally from the development of standard-
ized contract terms at the industry level, as discussed in paragraph 1.33, the end result is 
some measure of standardization in contract terms. Moreover, the practice of adopting by 
contract the content of regulatory rules represents neither self-regulation as traditionally 
understood nor is it comparable to the mandatory management contract discussed in para-
graph 1.31. Nonetheless, the practice may represent the depth of regulation’s reach into 
private parties’ conduct and uncoerced choices. 
 3.  Regulatory choices and liability 
 As discussed in paragraph 1.15, regulation and liability might be understood as substitutes 
for each other, at least in a theoretical sense. However, this book illustrates a more complex 
picture; for one thing, the systemic issues associated with asset management imply that rely-
ing simply on after-the-fact applications of liability rules would be grossly inadequate. Some 
measure of before-the-fact regulation thus seems so inevitable that only its relationship to 
after-the-fact liability is salient, in particular how ex ante regulation and ex post liability 
determinations might best complement each other. Also complicating the account is the fact 
that in some jurisdictions, regulators themselves are signifi cant enforcers of liability rules 
with the objective of seeking compensation on behalf of clients from investment managers 
whose breaches of regulatory rules have injured clients or resulted in unjust enrichment to 
the manager. 84 Th us, liability rules imply choices about mechanisms for enforcement, the 
relationship between public institutions and private parties as enforcers through litigation 
processes, and the use of procedures within the administrative process in contrast to litiga-
tion in general courts as forums for enforcement by regulatory bodies. Even within a system 
of broad-reaching regulation, it is unsurprising that managers’ clients turn to litigation when 
the manager overreaches its authority under the management contract or acts inconsistently 
with instructions received from the client. 85 Whether the manager has complied with an 
agent’s most basic obligation — to act within (and only within) the scope of authority — is of 
utmost importance to the client but perhaps not so pressing from the perspective of the more 
systemic concerns that justify regulation. 
81  Ibid 444–5. See also Riles, Collateral Knowledge, 227 (‘new architectures historically have never worked 
at the level of design. Where regulatory reforms have succeeded, it has been because, in one way or another, they 
enroll the targets or clients of regulation in the regulatory mission and encourage them to take responsibility for 
the regulatory problem’). 
82  See paras 12.68–12.74, 12.79 (Ireland); para 7.58 (the Netherlands); para 5.42 (Italy). 
83  See para 5.43 (Italy). 
84  eg England and Wales (see paras 11.21–11.22). In the United States, in which a private party’s remedies 
for violations of the Advisers Act are limited to rescission of the advisory contract, proceedings brought by the 
SEC (or in criminal matters the federal Department of Justice) and by state regulators are a signifi cant source of 
monetary relief for clients (see para 13.112).  
85  See para 9.68 (Spain). 
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 One measure of the eff ectiveness of a particular regulation is whether the regulation, if com-
plied with, forecloses or reduces conduct by an asset manager that would, to some degree of 
probability, result in liability. Consider in this light three examples of specifi c regulations 
discussed above, beginning with licensing requirements as implemented in Ireland and 
Canada. In Ireland, as noted in paragraph 1.22, obtaining a licence as an asset manager 
requires affi  rmative vetting by the Central Bank of the manager’s senior personnel and direc-
tors towards the objective of assuring competence and probity. If eff ective, this vetting 
requirement creates an ex ante roadblock that denies admission to the profession of actors 
who are likely to indulge in liability-generating conduct. Eff ectiveness turns on the Central 
Bank’s ability to predict future conduct based on the information then available to it, so that 
it may make an informed decision whether or not to grant a licence or impose particular 
restrictions on a manager. Th is might, of course, be backstopped by the Bank’s subsequent 
ability to revoke or restrict a licence because of new information. Canadian licensing require-
ments, which share the same general objectives, are noteworthy because they use a proxy to 
determine competence, which is whether an individual portfolio manager (unless individu-
ally exempted) holds the CFA designation and has a stated number of years of experience. 
Although the CFA requirement functions as a barrier to entry to the asset management pro-
fession (and arguably may raise fees) and does not represent a proxy for assessing an indi-
vidual’s probity, 86 it strengthens the ethos of the industry as a whole and should at least help 
foreclose liability stemming from a manager’s lack of competence. Its eff ectiveness may thus 
be a function to some degree of increased professionalism within the industry, distinct from 
the accuracy of the requirement as a proxy measure for competence. Additionally, designa-
tion as a CFA brings an investment manager within the ambit of the CFA Institute, thereby 
reinforcing professional identity and compliance with the Institute’s rules, which signifi -
cantly overlap with and reinforce regulatory and self-regulatory requirements, as well as 
requirements imposed by the general law. 87 
 Th e regulation of custody arrangements (see paras 1.24–1.27) responds to more specifi c risks 
than do requirements for licensing. Th at is, physical custody of or control over a client’s 
portfolio assets presents a focused occasion or opportunity for the occurrence of specifi c 
adverse events; the regulatory concern that asset managers be competent persons of suitable 
probity ranges more broadly against a wide landscape potentially blighted by breaches of 
many sorts of duties. As individual chapters detail, the jurisdictions covered by this book 
vary in how custody arrangements are regulated or, alternatively, governed by an industry 
practice that is not explicitly required by applicable regulation. Categorical requirements 
that segregate custodial from management functions, such as the requirement that only a 
licensed bank may serve as custodian of a client’s portfolio assets, may foreclose the occur-
rence of conduct that would result in liability on the part of an asset manager more eff ectively 
than do regulations, cast in more general terms, that impose duties on the manager itself. 
To the extent that such a categorical requirement increases the overall costs of manage-
ment ultimately borne by the client, the costs may be justifi ed by the regulatory effi  cacy 
generated by a tailored response to specifi c serious risks of injury to clients. Custody arrange-
ments are not the sole context in which a regulator might consider a shift towards 
more categorical requirements. In its October 2011 Proposal for a MiFID II Directive, 
86  See para 14.214. 
87  See n 38. 
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the European Commission proposed a ban on the receipt of inducements from third parties 
or persons acting on their behalf in relation to the provision of service to clients, which would 
apply both to portfolio managers and to investment advisers who inform clients that they 
provide advice on an independent basis. 88 Th e ban would replace the present MiFID regime, 
in which (for example) an inducement may be accepted under an exemption that turns on 
whether it is ‘value adding’, enhancing the value of the service to the client. 89 
 Mandated disclosure of information, discussed in paragraphs 1.18–1.21, a universally used 
technique within the repertoire of contemporary securities regulation, also has implications 
for asset managers’ liability. For starters, misstatements by the manager in response to disclo-
sure requirements could be a basis for liability to a client, subject to the requisites detailed in 
the individual chapters that follow. Distinct from the consequences of the manager’s breach 
of a regulatory rule (which vary across jurisdictions), the misstatement may be actionable 
within the law of tort. Separately, compliance with disclosure requirements may operate to 
protect a manager against liability to a client. As detailed in the individual chapters, informa-
tion available to the client, whether or not prompted by disclosure requirements, may under-
cut the reasonableness of the client’s reliance on assertions allegedly made by the manager. 
More generally, scholarly treatments of the history and role of disclosure within securities 
regulation often begin with a quotation from Louis Brandeis: ‘Sunlight is said to be the best 
of disinfectants: electric light the most effi  cient policeman.’ 90 In the context of asset manage-
ment, mandated disclosure of information about the asset manager and its personnel may 
foreclose liability because, accurately disclosed, the information enlightens investors to avoid 
dealing with that manager! 
 Th is book’s concluding chapter discusses four themes that are central to the impact of a regu-
latory scheme on a manager’s private law duties and liability for the jurisdictions covered by 
this book. Th ese are: (1) whether the manager’s breach of a regulatory duty aff ects the man-
ager’s private law liability; (2) whether (and to what extent) contractual derogations from 
regulatory duties are eff ective; (3) the impact of a breach of regulatory duty on the validity of 
the asset management contract; and (4) whether a manager’s duties under private law may be 
stricter or more demanding than the applicable regulatory duties. Signifi cant variations are 
evident on these points among the jurisdictions covered by the book. Of course, the jurisdic-
tions included in this book diff er on other issues as well. 91 Although we venture no assess-
ment of the overall signifi cance or importance of each of these diff erences, their presence and 
persistence is striking. Additionally, this book may serve to establish that its subject is not a 
‘merely’ technical area of law, although technical and highly detailed it surely is at the levels 
of both regulation and private law. Th e questions identifi ed above, and many others addressed 
by this book, have broad implications about relationships among formally discrete bodies of 
law and regulation and among state-authorized regulatory bodies and their regulated 
constituencies. 
88  Proposal for MiFID II of 20 October 2011, COM (2011) 656 fi nal, Art 25(5)–(6). 
89  See para 2.74 (MiFID). 
90  Cox et al, Securities Regulation, 3, quoting Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money 62 (1914). 
91  Th ese include the bases on which a manager may incur pre-contractual liability towards a prospective 
client and whether a manager must account to the client for profi ts or other benefi ts received by the manager 
without the client’s consent and in breach of the manager’s duty of loyalty. 
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